Summary

The case began as an action for replevin. Id. at 146. The goods in question were, at the time of the action, in the possession of a deputy sheriff. Id. The sheriff alleged that the goods were rightfully in his possession as the result of an attachment against their owner, John B. Cross. Id. The plaintiff, Bartels, claimed that the goods were rightfully his because Cross had conveyed them to him prior to the issuance of the attachment; Bartels was a signatory on several of Cross’s notes, and Cross conveyed him the goods as security. Id. The defendant countered that the conveyance was fraudulent – that Bartels and Cross designed the conveyance for the purpose of protecting Cross’s property from Cross’s other creditors (to whom Cross had stopped payment). Id. at 149. After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds of improper jury instruction. Id. at 148-49. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine denied the motions. Id. at 153. The case cites two cases about slavery: De Fonclear v. Shottenkirk, 1808 WL 1261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808) and Sands v. Codwise, 1808 WL 1216 (N.Y. 1808). De Fonclear was cited by the court in support of a rule that a verdict cannot be set aside when “there was evidence submitted on both sides.” Bartels at 150. The rule is more clearly explained in De Fonclear: when it is unclear whether a sale is absolute, and there is evidence on both sides, the determination should be left to the jurors (as “competent judges of the fact”). De Fonclear 170, 173. De Fonclear concerned the assumption of risk in the sale of an enslaved person. Id. at 173. The plaintiff, who owned the slave, entered an oral agreement to sell the slave to the defendant. Id. at 170. After the oral agreement, but before putting the agreement into writing, the defendant took possession of the slave and the slave escaped. Id. The main question put before the court was, who was liable for the escaped slave? Id. at 171. The jury determined that the plaintiff was liable. Id. The plaintiff appealed on several grounds (including improper jury instruction), id.; the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 175. The case does not discuss what happened to the enslaved person after running away. It is possible that the court had access to additional information about the person – the case references “newly discovered evidence” that had come to light after the trial, id. at 171 – the case specifically omits discussion of that evidence from the opinion. Id. at 172. Sands was cited in the defendant’s argument. The defendant argued that the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that they should determine whether the conveyance was fraudulent. Id. at 148-49. According to the defendant, the question of fraud was, in this case, a question of law that should have been determined by the judge. Id. at 149. The defendant furthermore argued that any payments the plaintiff had made to the creditors should not “affect the case; for if the conveyance was void for fraud in the concoction, it cannot stand as a security for subsequent advances.” Id. Sands is used to support this lattermost proposition. Sands, like Bartels, concerned an allegation that a conveyance was being used for the fraudulent purpose of defeating the rights of creditors against a debtor. Sands at 536. Amongst the “property” at issue in Sands was enslaved people. Id. at 552, 564. There is very little information about the enslaved people in the case: the debtor owned an unspecified number of slaves, id. at 552, they were sold at public auction, id., and two were bought by one of the appellants. Id. at 564. Bartels has been cited in four other cases and four secondary sources. Titcomb v. McAllister, 77 Me. 353, 355 (1885) (stating that a bill of sale can be considered a mortgage, rather than an absolute sale); French v. Chase, 6 Me. 166, 170 (1829) (stating that it is not necessary for collateral security to have a value certainly exceeding the amount of the debt); Fromme v. Jones, 13 Iowa 474, 477 (1862) (stating that chattel mortgage can be used as security against other creditors); Torbert v. Hayden, 11 Iowa 435, 436 (1861) (stating that chattel mortgage is void only if a jury finds it to be fraud in fact); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Bill of Sale, Absolute on Its Face, as a Chattel Mortgage, 33 A.L.R.2d 364 (2024); George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 363, 403 n.244 (1999) (providing examples of “northern state[s] upholding the nonpossessory secured transaction when challenged by a third party”); George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment Lien in the Pre-Chattel Mortgage Act Era, 20 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 12 n.38 (2000) (providing examples of early nineteenth century cases in Northern states involving commercial merchants lending to townspeople); George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Impact of Textile Machinery on the Chattel Mortgage Acts of the Northeast, 52 Okla. L. Rev. 303, 304 n.5 (1999) (providing examples of early nineteenth century cases in which courts honored an insolvent debtor’s preference for one creditor over another).