Summary

Abbott v. Holway regarded an action brought by a wife, Clarissa Abbott (plaintiff), against her then-deceased husband, James Abbott, for disposing of wood from their lumber farm in Pittston, Maine, located in Kennebec County. Mr. Abbott died in May of 1875 so the defendant was Oscar Holway, the administrator of Mr. Abbott’s estate. Mrs. Abbott asserted the deed created a contingent remainder interest in the property when it was executed in April of 1872, allowing her to bring suit for waste committed to the property during Mr. Abbott’s lifetime. Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 (1881). The defendant argued the deed was invalid because it was in opposition to feudal law and public policy—a mere executory agreement that conveyed interest in futuro. Id. at 304. The court found, however, that modern practices of registering deeds in public records and the modern desire to be able to own and transfer land as a grantor sees fit both supported the requirements of public policy and overrode feudal law. The court found that the deed clearly and successfully granted a contingent right in the property to Mrs. Abbott and because the condition happened—Mr. Abott died—she was the owner of the property in fee simple. Id. at 305. However, the interest vested upon the satiation of the condition, not upon the execution of the deed. Id. Thus, while Mr. Abbott was alive, he was free to do what he wanted to the property so long as he did not dispose of the property in a way which defeated the remainder’s interest in the property. Id. at 308; see also King v. Sharp, 25 Tenn. 55 (1845). Unfortunately for Mrs. Abbott, the selling of wood from the lumber farm did not rise to the level of waste known to common law at that time, so her suit failed. In discussing waste committed to property that impacts the remainder’s interest in the property, the Maine Supreme Court cited King v. Sharp. Sharpe was a case out of the Tennessee Supreme Court in which a husband’s will listed his slaves by name and assigned each person (including their children) to his wife, Mary King, and his children, under certain conditions. King v. Sharp, 25 Tenn. 55 (1845). One slave, Nan—including any of Nan’s children—were to be inherited by Mr. King’s children when they came of age. Id. at 56. During Mary’s lifetime, she remarried to become Mrs. Morgan and Nan, the named enslaved woman, had a daughter, Amy. Amy also had two children: Philip and Betsy. Mrs. Morgan sold Amy, Betsy and Philip to the defendant, Sharp, and Amy had a third child: Nancy. Sharp was made aware upon the sale that Mrs. Morgan only had a life interest in the enslaved people, which he would be bound to. However, Sharp went on to traffic Amy, Betsy, Philip and Nancy to an unknown slave trader. Because Sharp was made aware of Mrs. Morgan’s life estate in the enslaved people, the court found that he had committed a fraudulent breach of trust against Mrs. Morgan’s children (he affected their reminder interest in the property). Id. at 57. Therefore, Sharp was liable for the value of the enslaved people when the interested vested to Mrs. Morgan’s children upon her death. Because Sharp was unable to locate the enslaved people, the outcome of Amy, Betsy, Philip and Nancy remained unknown at the resolution of the case.